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1. Introduction 
The Workplace Relations Act (WRA) introduced in Australia in 1996 was an emphatic 
expression of the trend initiated by the Hawke-Keating Accord process where the 
“centralisation of wage fixing through national wage cases in the Industrial Relations 
Commission, determined by principles based on cost of living and national productivity 
indicators, has been replaced by a new decentralised approach” (Mortimer, 2000: 175). 
The trend became apparent toward the end of the Hawke-Keating Government where 
microeconomic efficiency became the catch cry of those determined to deregulate the 
labour market. 
The most recent Earnings and Hours data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics shows 
that at May 2000 the most common method of setting pay was unregistered individual 
agreements (38.2 per cent) (ABS, 6302.0). Thus legislative changes (the WRA) have 
installed the private commercial contract as the major instrument for determining wages 
and conditions. Given the history of specialised judicial processes for arbitration and 
conciliation in Australian labour relations, this is a major change and raises a range of 
questions both legal and economic (see Carlson, Mitchell and Watts, 2001, hereafter 
CMW).  
With persistently high unemployment present, the move to decentralisation was 
motivated by the view (not shared by these authors) that increased employment growth 
required a reversal of the wage share gains made in the 1970s. The Accord successfully 
shifted national income back to profits by generally cutting real wages (CMW, 2001). 
Since then, wages policy has sought to match real wages growth and productivity at the 
plant level through decentralisation and deregulation. The direction of policy has reflected 
a faith in neoclassical employment theory, discredited in the 1930s, rather than any firm 
empirical evidence. Employment changes between 1983 and 2000 have not shown any 
close correlation with real wage movements. Further, persistently high unemployment 
remains and there is strong evidence linking demand fluctuations to employment and 
unemployment changes over this period (Mitchell and Muysken, 2001; Mitchell, 2001). 
CMW (2001) examined the impact of the new forms of wage determination on wage 
outcomes in Australia and found that between 1995 and 2000, aggregate labour 
productivity growth (measured as output per person employed) exceeded the growth in 
real wages. The data suggests that productivity movements were only partially being 
passed on in the form of lower prices and/or higher nominal wage outcomes, so that 
businesses were using the productivity gains to expand their margins. 
The policies of real wage restraint were not unique to Australia. In 1982, the Akkoord van 
Wassenaar was introduced in the Netherlands in the aftermath of the oil crises of the 
1970s. It shared the same philosophy as the Australian Accord in that trade unions leaders 
agreed to wage moderation in return for a promise of employment growth. While Dutch 
employment growth achieved “miracle” proportions in the 1990s, the causal role of the 
Wassenaar Akkoord is unclear (Muysken, 2001). Given that the wage share has fallen 
consistently in the Netherlands, the moderation of real wages has allowed the businesses 
to use their productivity gains to expand their margins. 
The major difference between Australia and the Netherlands in recent years is that in the 
latter wage determination through sectoral wage negotiations and binding collective 
extension of the results is still widely practiced and accepted. There has been no change 
equivalent to the WRA. 
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In this paper, we seek to assess the extent to which real hourly earnings in a specific 
industry are driven by movements in own-labour productivity (measured as gross value 
added per hour) and economy-wide productivity in Australia and the Netherlands. We 
also assess whether the introduction of the Workplace Relations Act (1996) has changed 
this relationship in Australia. Netherlands is used as a control, since it has not undergone 
any substantial changes to its wage determination system over the period examined. 
We find in Australia, there is no systematic relationship between productivity and the real 
consumption wage by industry. Sectoral productivity is an important influence in some 
industries and economy wide productivity in others, but the rank correlation of real and 
nominal wages is relatively high over the period 1985-2000, although the standard 
deviation of sectoral productivity has exhibited a rising trend. 
In the Netherlands, movements in industry hourly wage costs deflated by the CPI are in 
general more strongly influenced by sectoral productivity movements, rather than by 
economy-wide conditions over the period 1970-2000. Both wage costs and hourly 
productivity by industry exhibit a rising standard deviation. Yet after the Wassenaar 
Akkoord the rank correlation of nominal hourly wage costs has remained very high. This 
leads to our conclusion that businesses were able to use price changes to enhance margins 
and per unit profits. 
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we summarise the extant theoretical and 
empirical literature. A model of wage determination is specified in Section 3. In Section 4 
we provide an overview of trends in wages and productivity by industry in Australia and 
the Netherlands, which we use to motivate the more formal analysis. In the following 
section econometric estimation is undertaken to test our model of wage setting at the 
industry level for the two countries. Concluding remarks follow. 
2. Literature Review 
Salter’s (1960) seminal study of structural change in the UK found there were no 
systematic relationships between the growth of earnings per worker and productivity 
growth per worker by industry. He concluded that wage increases were determined by 
economy wide rather than industry specific factors.  
In a cross-country study, Holmlund and Zetterberg (1991) found that the growth in 
industry wages in the USA were most sensitive to sectoral price and productivity changes, 
thereby confirming the importance of non-competitive forces. In contrast, industry wage 
setting in the Nordic countries (Sweden, Finland and Norway) was largely unaffected by 
sectoral conditions although wages drift remained a significant component of wage 
increases in both Sweden and Norway. The level of the expected average real 
consumption wage, a proxy for economy wide economic conditions, was strongly 
significant for all countries except the USA. The level of unemployment did not have a 
significant negative coefficient for all countries. 
Bell and Freeman (1991) investigated the rising inter-industry wage dispersion in the 
USA between 1970 and 1987. They found that while 60 per cent of the increase arose 
from competitive market factors, a significant component of this trend was attributable to 
noncompetitive factors, resulting from the strong link between long term trends in 
industry wages and productivity growth. They found, however that the rank order 
correlation between the beginning and ending years was in excess of 0.9 for measures of 
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both weekly and hourly earnings, so that the increased dispersion was manifested in an 
orderly widening of the wage distribution (Bell and Freeman, 1991: 278). 
Appelbaum and Schettkat (1995) found a weak correlation (0.33) between the growth 
rates of real consumption wages and productivity across 11 sectors in Australia over the 
period 1979-89. They concluded that the growth rates of nominal industry wages were not 
directly linked to their corresponding rates of productivity growth, but rather to economy 
wide developments. 
Watts and Mitchell (1990) examined the impact of incomes policy in Australia on the 
adult male inter-industry wage structure. The rank correlation coefficients associated with 
weekly ordinary time earnings were relatively high between 1975 and 1981. Traditional 
relativities were restored during the Accord period following the 1981-82 wage 
breakouts. They did not analyse productivity growth across industries and the analysis of 
average weekly ordinary time earnings conflated movements in hours of work and hourly 
wages. 
3. A model of wage determination 
We can capture these empirical findings in a model relating wage formation to 
productivity and unemployment. We begin with a Phillips curve specification: 
(1) w p g u cβ− = − +  
where w, p, g, u and c are the logarithms of aggregate wages, prices, productivity, 
unemployment and a constant, respectively. The real consumption wage in sector i 
follows the aggregate wage, but is also positively related to relative productivity:  
(2) ( ) ( )i i iw p w p g gγ− = − + −  
Equations (1) and (2) then yield: 
(3) ( )1i i i iw p g g u cγ γ β− = − + − +  
The model captures the competing hypotheses about the determination of sectoral wages, 
with both sectoral-specific productivity and economy-wide productivity, along with a 
further proxy for economic conditions, the unemployment rate also being included. 
As noted, Holmund and Zetterberg (1991) found that γi was low while β = 0, particularly 
for Europe. Freeman and Bell (1991) also found a higher value of γi for the USA. In a 
decentralised system, γi should be higher unless offset by high labour mobility, whereas in 
a centralised system economy-wide factors would be expected to be influential. 
The sectoral wage share can be defined as the log of real wages per hour minus the log of 
productivity per hour. Thus: 
(4) i i i iws w p g= − −  
Baumol (1967) argues that relative sectoral price movements will reflect relative 
productivity. Hence: 
(5) ( )i i ip p g gδ− = − −  
Solving equations (3) and (5) for the sectoral wage rate in terms of its own price yields: 
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(6) ( ) ( )1i i i i i i iw p g g
u c
γ δ γ δ
β
− = − − + +
− +
 
From (1) and (3), it can be shown that the sector i relative wage share depends on relative 
productivity. Appelbaum and Schettkat (1995: 615) found that for Australia, Denmark, 
Finland and Japan, the wage share has declined faster in industries with higher rates of 
productivity growth.  
4. Stylised Facts 
The data used are described in the Data Appendix. Table 1 compares sectoral 
employment, value-added, wage and productivity measures for Australia and the 
Netherlands in 2000. The sectoral composition of employment and value added is similar 
in the two countries. For both, relative wages are higher in manufacturing compared to 
services. The wage rate for non-commercial services (see data appendix) is relatively 
higher in Australia, probably reflecting the share of public sector employment. 
Productivity differentials are more dispersed than wage differentials. This is also reflected 
in the trends in productivity levels in manufacturing and services expressed relative to 
total productivity which are shown in Figure 1.  
Table 1 Australia and the Netherlands, 2000 
Share in Total Ratio to Total 
Netherlands N V W G 
Manufacturing 0.17 0.20 1.16 1.63 
Construction 0.08 0.07 0.97 0.55 
Commercial services 0.54 0.49 0.97 0.82 
Non-commercial services 0.15 0.11 0.88 0.44 
Australia     
Manufacturing 0.15 0.14 1.08 1.04 
Construction 0.09 0.06 1.03 0.79 
Commercial services 0.49 0.48 0.92 0.98 
Non-commercial services 0.26 0.23 1.11 0.87 
Note: N is employment, V is value-added, W is the wage rate and G is labour productivity. 
Table 2 (see page 8) show the annual average compound growth rates for various periods 
for employment, hourly wages and hourly productivity by sector for Australia and the 
Netherlands, respectively.  We also include sectoral prices for the Netherlands. The 
differential between relative sectoral productivity in manufacturing and services in 
Australia is less clear than in the Netherlands, but relative manufacturing productivity 
does appear to exhibit a rising trend. Further analysis is required. 
Sectoral prices are only available for the Netherlands and have moved inversely with 
relative productivity. This is consistent with equation (5). 
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Figure 1 Relative sectoral productivity, Australia and the Netherlands, various years 
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(b) Australia, 1985-2001 
Source: see Data Appendix. 
Figure 2 shows relative sectoral nominal hourly wages in both countries accord with our 
model. Manufacturing wages rise faster than aggregate wages, which is consistent with its 
higher rate of relative rate of productivity growth. The converse holds for services in the 
Netherlands, but relative wages in the services sector have increased in Australia. 
Figure 2 Relative sectoral wages for Australia and the Netherlands, various years 
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(b) Australia, 1985-2001 
Source: see Data Appendix. 
Wage Share 
The model in Section 3 implies that the wage share in services will lie consistently above 
the aggregate wage share, whereas the manufacturing wage will lie consistently below. 
Figure 3 computes the sector wage shares expressed as ratios to the total wage share for 
the Netherlands. Apart from the turbulent period around the oil crises, the relative 
services wage share is generally greater than unity and the relative manufacturing share is 
generally below unity. 
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Data limitations prevent sectoral wage shares for Australia being computed. CMW (2001) 
examined trends in the Australian non-farm wage share since September 1959. While 
counter- cyclical patterns were evident over the entire period, there was a modest 
increasing trend up to the Accord (1983). Two notable rises occurred in the mid 1970s 
and in 1982/83. Over the Accord period, the wage share trended downward with some 
slowing of this movement due to the 1990s recession. The aggregate wage share is now 
stable around this lower level with no break attributable to the introduction of the WRA. 
Figure 3 Relative sectoral wage share, the Netherlands, 1951-2000 
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Source: see Data Appendix. 
Industry Wage and Productivity Dispersion 
Figure 4 shows the standard deviations of the log of real hourly wages (using the Implicit 
Price Deflator) and the log hourly productivity by industry for the Netherlands and 
Australia. The standard deviations of hourly consumption wages and productivity 
increase in a broadly similar manner, which would be expected. In Australia, there is also 
a systematic increase in sectoral productivity differences. Of note is that there has been no 
significant increase in the standard deviation of real wages since the mid-1990s, in spite 
of the introduction of the WRA which would be expected to increase wage differentials 
with wage movements more closely reflecting productivity movements. 
Rank Correlation 
We can gauge how disparate the industry wage outcomes are by computing rank 
correlations. High rank correlation would be consistent with industry wage outcomes 
following common patterns (or leadership).  
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Figure 4 Standard deviations of hourly wages and productivity, Australia and the 
Netherlands 
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Source: see Data Appendix. 
Figure 5 shows the rank correlations of hourly nominal wages for the two countries for 
1986-2000, based on 1985. The Australian rank correlations are based on annual (four-
quarter) average nominal wages whereas the Dutch calculations are based on annual 
nominal wage costs per hour. The correlations remain the same if real consumption wages 
are used. While the Australian figures lie below the Dutch, there are more Australian 
sectors. All the rank correlations are significant at the .01 level in a one tailed test. 
Since 1985 the correlation between sectoral productivity growth and the level of sectoral 
wages in the Netherlands has been generally positive and quite high. This confirms the 
stability of the rank order of sectoral wages, despite greater influence of sectoral 
productivity. In contrast, sector wage setting in Australia is less sensitive to sector 
specific factors (see Section 5). 
Figure 5 Rank Correlations for hourly wages, Australia and the Netherlands. 
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Source: see Data Appendix.  
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5. Regression analysis 
To examine the model developed in Section 3, we estimated real hourly wages equations 
at the industry level for both countries. The regressions took the form (in logs): 
(7) ( ) ( )0 1 21
3 1
/ / itit it
t t it
w p w p g
g u e
α α α
α β
−
−
= + +
+ + +
 
where w/p are hourly real wages in industry i, gi is the corresponding output per hour 
worked in industry i, g is All-industry output per hour worked, and u is aggregate 
unemployment. This model allows us to discriminate between the influences of sectoral 
productivity on real hourly wages by industry relative to the impacts of industry-wide 
productivity movements. 
The Australia models were supplemented with a range of dummy variables designed to 
test for the impact of the different Accord phases (full indexation, partial indexation, 
structural efficiency, and enterprise bargaining) and the introduction of the WRA (various 
thresholds were tested). For the Netherlands, we tested for structural breaks associated 
with the Wassenaar Akkoord. Maximum likelihood estimation corrected for first-order 
serial correlation was used and the equations were subjected to the usual diagnostic tests 
and were generally satisfactory. 
For comparisons, the reported results are based on equation (3), with the real 
consumption wage as the dependent variable. We also ran regressions for the Netherlands 
using the real product wage (using the specific industry sectoral price deflators) and make 
references to those results later. The long-run own elasticities reported in Tables 3 and 4 
are 2 1/(1 ) iα α γ− =  and the total elasticities are 3 1/(1 ) 1 iα α γ− = −  for the two countries. 
The product wage equivalents for the Netherlands are 2 1/(1 ) i iα α γ δ− = +  (own 
elasticities), and 3 1/(1 ) (1 )i iα α γ δ− = − −  (total elasticities). Full results are available 
from the authors. 
For Australia, real hourly wages in some industries are driven by economy-wide 
productivity trends, while for others; it is predominantly own-industry productivity that 
matter. In only four service industries (Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants; Finance 
and Insurance; Property and Business Services; and Cultural and Recreation Services), 
the restriction that the sum of these elasticities is unity is accepted. The model in Section 
3 therefore serves as an approximation only. Thus workers in most industries do not fully 
share in labour productivity growth within the economy. Only workers in Cultural and 
Recreation Services gain full compensation for their industry-specific productivity 
increases. 
This undermines the rationale of current policy, which is pushing for further wage setting 
decentralisation. Industry productivity growth is thus being used to expand profit 
margins. Accordingly, with unemployment still persistently high, it is not clear that the 
wage share declines stimulated by changing wage arrangements since the early 1980s 
have been beneficial to the bulk of Australians. 
There is also clear evidence that the unemployment rate constrains hourly wages across 
industries in both services and goods producing sectors. There is no clear relationship 
between the effect of unemployment and the size of iγ . This effect, where present, is of a 
higher magnitude than in the Netherlands. 
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Most of the significant (negative) break effects are associated with the final two Accord 
stages (DA3 and DA4) when the Government pursued decentralisation. The WRA does 
not exert a major additional effect in this sample. The results reflect the findings of CMW 
(2001) who argued that the key share changes occurred in the 1980s rather than in the 
1990s. 
The results for the Netherlands reveal that sector productivity effects are generally 
stronger than for Australia. In two industries, Construction’ Education, Health and 
Community Services; and Wholesale and Retail, productivity increases at the industry 
level are fully passed on in higher real consumption wages. 
The real product regressions for the Netherlands yielded larger own industry elasticities 
thereby revealing the significance of iδ , which measures the impact of the relative levels 
of productivity on relative prices (equation 5). The sum ( (1 )i iγ γ+ − ) is more often 
accepted in these regressions thus provide stronger support for the model in Section 3. 
More research is indicated here. 
6. Conclusion 
We have shown that despite the trend towards decentralised wage setting in Austalia, 
wage earners are not being fully compensated for productivity increases and sectoral 
productivity, in particular is playing a minor role in wage outcomes. In constrast, despite 
its differential institutional wage setting arrangements, sectoral wage increases in the 
Netherlands are more closely linked to sectoral productivity changes, although in most 
industries too, industry productivity gains have been used to expand margins. 
William F. Mitchell, Joan Muysken and Martin Watts 
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Table 2 Sectoral employment, wage and productivity growth rates, Netherlands and 
Australia 
Industry Measure 1971-1984 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 1985-2000
Netherlands       
Manufacturing Employment -3.49 1.05 -1.99 0.55 -0.14 
 Hourly wage costs 3.42 1.94 0.86 2.65 1.82 
 Sector price 3.82 3.03 0.26 2.25 1.84 
 GVA per hour 5.82 2.04 3.55 2.19 2.59 
Construction Employment -3.91 1.31 0.14 2.74 1.39 
 Hourly wage costs 3.12 3.24 -0.98 -0.22 0.67 
 Sector price 7.60 2.93 2.69 2.67 2.76 
 GVA per hour 1.86 3.00 -1.44 0.17 0.56 
Commercial Services Employment -0.48 2.47 2.31 4.38 3.05 
 Hourly wage costs 2.68 1.55 0.15 0.72 0.80 
 Sector price 6.01 1.32 2.79 1.84 1.98 
 GVA per hour 3.48 1.10 0.46 1.14 0.90 
Non-Commercial Services Employment 2.06 1.12 1.55 3.46 2.03 
 Hourly wage costs 2.27 1.52 1.12 -0.82 0.60 
 Sector price 7.77 1.79 2.75 3.31 2.62 
 GVA per hour 0.90 0.56 0.26 -1.65 -0.28 
Total Economy Employment -1.45 1.58 0.93 3.09 1.86 
 Hourly wage costs 2.83 1.77 0.35 0.94 1.02 
 Sector price 6.25 0.86 1.62 2.16 1.55 
 GVA per hour 3.88 1.51 1.28 0.85 1.22 
Australia       
Manufacturing Employment n.a. 0.91 -1.11 0.46 0.09 
 Hourly wage n.a. -0.47 1.11 1.37 0.67 
 GVA per hour n.a. 0.86 1.70 2.75 1.77 
Construction Employment n.a. 4.36 0.29 3.12 2.58 
 Hourly wage n.a. 1.19 0.19 -0.20 0.39 
 GVA per hour n.a. -1.64 0.55 -0.07 -0.39 
Commercial Services Employment n.a. 4.39 1.65 2.39 2.80 
 Hourly wage n.a. -0.07 0.48 1.99 0.79 
 GVA per hour n.a. 0.96 1.29 3.43 1.89 
Non-Commercial Services Employment n.a. 3.64 2.47 2.19 2.76 
 Hourly wage n.a. -0.81 -0.19 1.39 0.12 
 GVA per hour n.a. 0.22 0.27 1.01 0.50 
Total Economy Employment n.a. 3.30 1.09 1.87 2.08 
 Hourly wage n.a. -0.44 0.42 1.22 0.40 
 GVA per hour n.a. 0.76 1.31 2.60 1.55 
Source: see Data Appendix. 
William F. Mitchell, Joan Muysken and Martin Watts 
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Table 3 Wage-productivity regressions, Australia, 1984 to 2001 
Industry Own 
Elasticity
Industry
Elasticity
UR Break Effect Unity 
Test 
R2 
Mining  0.35  A3, A4 -  0.76 
Manufacturing  0.52 -0.07 A3 -  0.92 
EGW  0.67  A3, A4 -  0.88 
Construction 0.54  -0.04 GST +  0.63 
Wholesale Trade 0.25  -0.06 A4, WRA -  0.79 
Retail Trade  0.40 -0.02    0.85 
Accom, Cafes, Restaurants  0.72    * 0.82 
Transport 0.16   A3 -  0.83 
Communications  0.47  1994 on +  0.87 
Finance  1.04    * 0.92 
Property and Business 0.27 0.54  GST + * 0.86 
Government  0.48 -0.09 A3, A4 -  0.93 
Education 0.20 0.22 -0.03 A1, A2 -  0.72 
Health and Community  0.54     0.78 
Cultural and Recreation 0.79  -0.07   * 0.53 
Personal and Other 0.31   A3 -  0.64 
Note: Own elasticity relates to sectoral productivity and the industry elasticity refers to the All industry 
effect. The Unity Test refers to a Wald test on the restriction that the productivity elasticity in total (own 
and industry equals unity. The * indicates acceptance of the null. 
 
Table 4 Wage-productivity regressions, The Netherlands, 1970 to 2001 
Industry Own 
Elasticity 
Industry
Elasticity
UR Break Unity 
Test 
 
R2 
Accommodation, Cultural and Personal 1.66 -0.10  1988 -  0.99
Chemical, Rubber and Other  0.75 -0.03 1995 -  0.99
Construction 0.71 0.05  1980 (a) + * 0.99
Education, Health and Community 1.01 0.29  1981 - * 0.98
Finance and Insurance  0.36  84, 94 (a) -  0.99
Manufacturing (Main)  1.22  1985 -  0.99
Manufacturing (Other)  0.56  1981 -  0.99
Manufacturing (Metals) 0.52  -0.02 1974 (a) +  0.99
Transport and Communications 0.67   1981 -  0.99
Wholesale and Retail Trade 0.85  -0.02 1980 - * 0.99
Notes: see Table 4. (a) denotes a single year impact whereas the other breaks are step-dummies. The sign 
next to the break year signifies the direction of the impact (- for negative, + for positive). 
 
Data Appendix 
Australia 
Employment and Total Hours Worked by industry came from the ABS, The Labour Force, 
Australia, Cat. No.6203.0. 
Gross value added data for 16 non-farm ANZSIC industries came from the ABS, National 
Accounts, Cat. No.5204.0. The value added series are chain indexes. Sectoral price indices 
were not available so wages were deflated by the non-farm implicit price deflator. 
Average hourly wages by industry were computed from the ABS, Average Weekly Earnings, 
6302.0.  
Manufacturing and construction are equivalent to the ANZSIC industries. Commercial-
services: Wholesale; Retail; Accommodation, cafes, restaurants; Transport; 
Communications; Finance and Insurance, Property and Business; Cultural and Recreation 
and Personal and Other. Non-commercial services: Education and Health and Community. 
Netherlands 
Annual data (1951-2000) came from the Centraal Planbureau (CPB). Hourly wages in the 
Netherlands were deflated with industry deflators. 
Manufacturing: Metaal; Overige; Voedings en genotmiddelen Chemische, rubber and 
kunststof. Construction: Bouwnijverheid en installatiebedrijven. Commercial services: 
Transport en opslag; Handel en reparatiebedrijven; Verhuur van en handel in onroerend 
goed; Uitzendbureaus and Tertiair Overige; Post en telecommunicatie; and Bank en 
verzekeringswezen. Non-commerical services: Zorg. 
William F. Mitchell, Joan Muysken and Martin Watts 
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